Such discontent is particularly evident in a letter from 1911, in which Whitehead is providing feedback on Russell’s draft of The Problems of Philosophy. But once the subject became the relationship of logic to ontology, we see discontents emerge. They were on the same page when discussing the relationship of logic to mathematics.
This is the period in which Russell and Whitehead move from agreements with respect to applied mathematics, to disagreements with respect to the philosophy of mathematics. These critiques were mainly through handwritten correspondence between Whitehead and Russell from 1911 to 1917. We might start with Alfred North Whitehead’s early critiques of some of analytic philosophy’s foundational presuppositions-particularly those of Bertrand Russell. As I have recently argued, the problem can be traced to foundational dichotomies between “mind” and “matter”-or, in more contemporary terms, between “the realm of nature” and “the realm of discourse,” between “the space of reasons” and the “space of causes.” The temptation in question resides in our ontological assumptions about what a language is, how mind relates to language, and how words and worlds relate. I’d like to suggest that Alfred North Whitehead can help us address this problematic temptation. But groping for a solid world of facts unmediated by social relations, or any other mental filters, may wind up being an unhelpful-if enticing-response. Undoubtedly, disinformation campaigns have recently begun to pose a dire threat for our democracy. This assumes a clean distinction between our social worlds and the “reality” behind them. A recent editorial in the New York Times frames this polarization in terms of social belonging, and suggests that our sense of community can override our grasp of the factual world. It is by this point a truism to say that our country is deeply polarized.
Research & Faculty Dropdown for Research & Faculty.Undergraduate Program in Religious Studies.
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